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I.
The purpose of this essay is to analyze the impact of foreign 
trade upon the state and civil society in the first decades of 
Mexican independence. It will focus both on socioeconomic and 
political aspects of that impact. First, it examines the foreign 
trade at the end of the colonial period and the first decades 
of independence by reviewing available data. Second, it gives 
a brief description of some of the most outstanding consequences 
of this trade in respect to distribution of the imported goods, 
and unemployment related to the overflow of foreign products, 
especially textiles. Third, the essay outlines two types of 
state reaction: a more defensive reaction, pointing out certain 
aspects of fiscal and customs policy concerning foreign trade 
(protective tariffs); and a more offensive reaction by the 
state which promoted industrialization in order to become more 
independent from imports. This last aspect of industrialization, 
however, is discussed only in terms of foreign contribution 
(import of machinery, skilled workers/technicians, investment 
of "foreign" capital) to the process of modernization. Finally, 
the essay concludes by trying to provide an answer to the 
question of why the early attempts at industrialization failed.
II.
Mexico began her independence without fundamental changes in 
her economic structure. Nor did the emancipation from the mother­
land mean that the patterns of foreign trade changed basically. 
Quite to the contrary, Mexico remained what she had already been: 
a supplier of raw materials and a customer of European manufac­
tures. The basic structure would not change until the last quarter 
of the 19th century, when the United States took over the rôle, 
occupied until then by the European states, of Mexico's most 
important trade partner.
An analysis of the products for import and export can prove 
that the colonial structure of Mexican economy and foreign trade 
remained unchanged in the first decades of national independence.
In the 25 years preceeding independence, the precious metals 
exported through the monopoly-port of Veracruz (nearly exclu­
sively silver), amounted to an average of 73.4% of all Mexican 
exports. The dominance of precious metals remained unchanged 
after 1821 :
Table 1: Mexican exports 1821-1828 (in %)
Year Precious metals Cochineal Indigo Vanilla Other Products
1821 84.5 12.1 1.9 0.3 1 .2
1822 73.5 22.8 2.1 0.2 1.4
1823 56.5 38.0 1.3 1 .0 3.2
1824 60.4 32.6 1 .0 2.0 4.0
1825 74.7 18.9 0.4 0.6 5.4
1826 76.5 17.7 0.4 0.4 5.0
1827 79.4 7.5 1 .2 7.5 4.4
1828 85.5 10.2 2.0 0.4 1 .9
Source: Juergen Schneider, Frankreich und die Unabhaengigkeit 
Spanisch-Amerikas. Zum französischen Handel mit den entstehen­
den Nationalstaaten (1810-1850). 2 vols., vol. 1, Stuttgart 
1981, p. 84
Coined silver remained the main export product; of relative 
importance were cochineal (a dye for silk and wool, exported 
mainly to France) and, in later years, dyewood. In the middle 
of the century, the importance of precious metals as export 
products was even higher and reached 90% of the total exports, 
while the importance of natural dyes declined because of the 
invention of synthetic chemical products in Europe.
Mexico's principal import commodities in the first 50 years of 
her independence were consumer products. More than 90% of her 
total import consisted in finished and semi-finished goods: 
textiles (mainly cotton and linen, to a lesser degree silk and 
wool), clothes, notions, food products and wines, china, crystal 
and glass, books and paper. By far the most important commodity 
was textiles; and under the heading textiles, far more than 50% 
were cotton goods. The textile imports were nearly totally 
composed of finished or semi-finished goods: textile fabrics
(more than 250 different kinds), cloth, ribbons, clothes, 
notions. Also, in single years, mainly in the 1840s and the 
second half of the century, major quantities of raw materials 
for textiles were imported.
The political independence of the country had definitely opened 
the locks to the import of foreign textiles. The first years 
after 1821 represented, compared to the last colonial years, 
nearly an import-explosion. In the years 1806-1819, something 
more than 23 million yards of cloth had been imported. After 
independence, only the top year' 1825 reached nearly the same 
quantity, and from 1821 to 1828 the import amounted to about 
80 million yards of cloth. At the same time, the price develop­
ment was inverse. From 1821 to 1828, the price of textile imports 
decreased by 22%, compared to the period between 1806 and 1819, 
although the import-volume had increased by 24 5%. Between 1806 
and 1819, the price for a yard of cloth was still 5.3 pesos; 
in the 1820s, this price fell to an average of 0.52 and in the 
middle of the century even to 0.15 pesos for a yard. The price 
decrease was especially noticeable in the area of cotton goods 
and, to a lesser degree in finer textiles such as silk. Due to 
the higher productivity of European industry, to the creation 
of new means of transportation (railroads, steamboats), and to 
the reduction of freight costs the import of textiles experienced 
a reduction in costs. Although the volume of textile imports 
increased, these articles suffered a relative decrease in their 
value compared to other imports: The value of imported textiles 
decreased from 49% in the 1820s to 36% in the 1870s.
The continuity of trade relations during the transition from 
the colonial to the independent era was maintained also with 
respect to Spain, Mexico’s most important trading partner - 
although only for a very few years, because with the outbreak 
of hostilities between the naval fort of San Juan de Ulua, still 
occupied by the Spanish, and the port of Veracruz, Mexico inter­
rupted all her commercial intercourse with her former motherland. 
From 1823 on, the direct imports from other European countries 
outstripped the Spanish ones.
In the first half of the 19th century, the European trading 
partners were much more important for Mexico than the U.S. Still 
in 1856, transaction with European partners amounted to 81%
(with U.S. firms: 41%) of the total trade value. In 1872/73, in 
contrast, economic transactions with North America had reached 
39% of the total Mexican trade value, and during the pax porfiriana 
the U.S. became the dominant factor in Mexico's foreign trade.
Since it is impossible to establish the amount of Mexican 
imports by foreign trade statistics, already in the mid 19th 
century the attempt was made to calculate average figures of 
Mexican import trade by using the import duties. (1) The state 
revenues coming from import duties, between 1828/29 and 1850/51 
amounted to about 120 million pesos. In the same time period, the 
import duties varied between 25% and 40%, reaching an average pay­
ment of 33%. The calculable value of the legal import goods there­
fore must have been three times as high as the import duties, i.e. 
almost 360 million pesos. This sum yields an average import volume 
of 16.3 million pesos a year. But, with certainty, the real import 
value lay much higher due to the fact that some import goods were 
free of duties and many were smuggled in.
From 1824 on, Great Britain was Mexico's main trading partner. In 
spite of the decisive importance of the British-Mexican trade, no 
reliable figures exist for the decade of the 1820s. Quite to the 
contrary, it is extremely difficult to figure out, even approxima­
tely, the volume and the value of British exports to Mexico.
Neither the British consular service nor official Mexican agencies 
had exact figures at their disposal. The former could not rely 
upon the figures of British merchants "because the greatest jealousy 
prevails among them" (2), the latter didn't want to give out 
exact figures because these would have proven the corruptability 
of Mexican port and custom authorities. On the other hand, the 
figures published in the British "Parliamentary Papers" do not 
include reports on the reshipment of British goods and manufactures 
from the U.S. to Mexico, nor do they include the exports from 
the West Indian islands, except when they were re-exported from 
Britain. Therefore, private estimates indicated export figures 
three times as high as the official ones. (3)
From the beginning on, the British delivered to the Mexican 
market mainly cotton textiles, to a lesser degree also linen and 
cloths of mixed materials. In 1856, textiles still formed 82% 
of all goods imported by Mexico from England; in 187 2 this per­
centage had decreased to 74%. Though Mexico's foreign trade sta­
tistics for the first half of the 19th century are incomplete and 
sometimes contradictory, the figures of table 2 (page 6) never­
theless provide an impression of the volume, reached by the trade 
with Europe and the U.S. But these figures have to be handled very 
carefully. Comparing, for example, the values of British and French 
import goods, we find that for 1825 to 1827 there is no great 
difference; in 1826, the French imports were even higher than 
the British - albeit all the diplomatic and consular despatches 
of these years indicate that the British were the leaders in the 
trade. On the other hand, the figures make clear that until the 
general crisis of 1826, British imports continuously increased.
The explanation for the difference, obviously too small, between 
the French and the British export volume possibly lies in one 
of the most frequent sources of statistical errors in 19th 
century Latin American trade figures; European customs officials 
always indicated the first port, entered by ships of their coun­
tries, as the definitive goal of the products carried by this 
ship, not considering, that a more or less large part of the 
shipment could be (and frequently was) consigned to another coun­
try. The U.S. trade statistics indicate that 50% to 80% of the 
goods exported from the U.S. to Mexico, were re-exported, i.e. 
they came from European countries and entered the U.S. ports 
(mainly New York and New Orleans) only as transit goods. In the 
1820s, the British Consul General in Mexico, Charles 0'Gorman, 
estimated that "about forty per cent of the goods imported from 
the United States through Tampico were of British origin" (4).
Since the re-export trade also concerned French and German goods, 
all the figures necessarily remain inexact. (5)
Nothwithstanding the statistical problems, for the purpose 
of this essay two aspects should be pointed out: The first is 
the fact that the Mexican import trade increased vigorously
Table 2: Mexico's foreign trade (in current pesos)
Year Mexico's import Mexico's export' 
from to 
FRANCE
Mexico's import 
from
UNITED
..........
Mexico's export 
to
STATES
Mexico's import 
from 
GREAT BRITAIN
Mexico's import 
from
HAMBURG and BREMEN
1821 5.380
1822 453.460
1823 1 .848.880
1824 j 2.762.020
1825 3.679.800 419.000 I 7.04 6.780
1826 2.860.400 618.800 ; 6.281.000 3.916.000 3.342.075
1827 2.985.000 1.089.400 j 4.173.000 5.232.000 6.140.200
1828 1 .998.400 1.352.600 2.886.000 4.814.000 2.671 .900 i
1829 1.946.800 1.617.800 2.331 .151 5.026.761 3.222.630 as
1830 4.645.400 1.180.000 4.837.458 5.235.241 9.474.085 1
1831 4.070.600 741.200 6.178.000 5.167.000 3.644.290
1832 2.680.000 1.575.400 3.467.541 4.293.954 999.105
1833 3.005.400 1.068.200 5.408.091 5.459.418 2.107.435
1834 2.408.200 1.348.800 5.265.053 8.666.668 2.298.050
1835 3.460.200 1.418.600 9.029.221 9.490.446 2.014.100
1836 1.900.000 1.740.800 6.040.635 5.615.819 1 .274.1 10
1837 1.927.600 1.422.400 3.880.323 5.654.002 2.601.000 1.466.000
1838 1.635.400 883.000 2.787.362 3.127.153 2.198.880 1.760.000
1839 2.268.400 915.800 2.164.097 5.500.707 3 .300.850 1.970.000
1840 2.798.800 1.477.800 2.515.341 4.175.001 2.326.650 1.750.000
1841 2.530.600 1.189.400 2.036.620 3.484.957 2.174.505 1.485.000
1842 2.281.400 1.050.800 1.534.933 1 .996.694 1 .874.845 735.563'
1843 2.388.800 1.384.400 1.471.937 2.782.406 2.989.685 929.950 n
1844 2.764.618 1.476.400 I 1.494.833 3.387.691 2.470.475 864.934 &
1845 2.540.400 1.557.800 ! 1.159.331 1.702.936 2.735.650 1.120.308
1846 2.079.400 1.477.600 j 1.531.180 1.836.621 1 .518.425 1.206.372
1847 680.400 347.000 ! 238.004 481.749 503.000 284.704
1848 3.935.342 1.109.620 4.054.459 1.581.247 4.730.000 • 1 .888.960
1849 6.535.837 1 .345.559 2.020.868 2.116.719 3.895.000 1 .209.400 r1850 4.556.191 1.708.160 2.012.827 2.135.866 1 .027.756,1
1851 5.069.165 1 . 146.686 1.581.763 1.804.779 ..... ...... .. . _ .. .  ..
Sources: Note 3a
after the country achieved its independence. And the second one 
is the enormous importance of textiles in the total import trade. 
During the 1820s, the proportion of textiles hovered between 58% 
and 70% of the total goods imported. (6) During the 19th century, 
they continued being by far the most important import product 
for Mexico.
III.
Several years ago there arose a controversy with regard to the 
immediate consequences of the massive influx of European textiles. 
This controversy referred to Latin America as a whole; neverthe­
less, it can be exemplified by the Mexican case: Most of the 
adherents of the so called dependency theory asserted (and still 
do so) that cheap European imports destroyed the local non compet­
itive manufactures, drove artisans and industrialists into un­
employment, had devastating consequences for the economy and 
the society as a whole. Javier Ortiz de la Tabla Ducasse f.ex. (7) 
interprets the substitution of England and later of the U.S. for 
Spain as Mexico's main trading partners as a "change of dependen­
cy" (cambio de dependencia); with the end of Spain's political 
supremacy over Mexico, the trade conditions became even worse 
for Mexico. Stanley and Barbara Stein have asserted that the 
massive imports of British manufactured goods "simply crushed 
local industry based upon primitive technology". (8) And Miguel 
A. Quintana pointed out that British yarn and textiles not only 
destroyed Mexican "hand industries" that had been playing an 
important rôle in the economic life of Latin American countries, 
but rather that they originated economic problems that "announced 
another foreign tutelage - possibly a stronger one that the last". 
(9)
On the contrary, other authors like D.C.M. Platt have pointed 
out the factors opposed to a big expansion of import trade (10): 
Trading opportunities were limited, the mass of the population 
was not in the market for manufactured goods, three-quarters of 
the Mexican population (indios and mestizos) could make no
contribution to the market, the purchasing power of the new 
republics was restricted, away from the main cities and seaports 
the population was sparse, transport conditions appaling, and 
the marketing of imported goods expensive and unrewarding. What­
ever the local circumstances, Platt says (the ravages of civil 
war, depopulation, the flight of Spanish capital, the abandonment 
and flooding of the mines), further progress in international 
trade was limited above all by the nature of the consumer and 
of his needs. In 1811, López Candelada had estimated the marginal 
population of Mexico that was not integrated in a "market economy", 
at 2.320.000 persons; Humboldt's estimation, some years earlier, 
was even higher: 2.5 millions. (11) The few wealthy people could 
buy the luxuries obtainable from Europe, and the only people who 
provided a market for the cheaper level of imports was a small 
middle class. In 1824, the British Consul General complained:
"A cargo of British goods of 10.000 pounds sterling principal 
would stock the market (of Acapulco) for three years." (12)
Dawn Keremitsis, in a study of the Mexican textile industry, 
also points out, that the main customers of European textiles 
were the upper and middle classes of Mexico City (13), and al­
ready in 1898 the former Mexican Finance Minister Matias Romero 
had stated (somewhat too categorically) that "only rich people 
could afford to consume foreign commodities." (14) Platt asserts, 
that only the cotton and woolen manufactories operating under 
Spanish monopolists at the end of the colonial period, the obrajes, 
felt "the cold draught of competition", whilst the handicraft 
industry continued to supply the greater part of popular needs 
right up to the development of a low cost, national manufacturing 
industry. The development of a substantial and competitive local 
factory production did far more than imports to displace home 
spinners and weavers. His conclusion is that imported manufac­
tured goods were far beyond the income of all but a few, concen­
trated in the major coastal and capital cities; the great majority 
of the Indians, i.e. the population as a whole continued to wear 
the products of local domestic industry late into the 19th 
century. (15)
References to the spread of European textiles in early in­
dependent Mexico are numerous. One of the major sources are 
travellers' accounts. Although some authors do not trust them, 
because understandably English and other foreign travellers 
would be inclined to point out evidence of the spread of British 
(and other European) products throughout the country, this kind 
of source is quite reliable if used carefully, especially if 
several different accounts are referred to and compared.
One of the earliest statements with regard to the spread of 
European textiles is found in the journal of Captain Basil Hall, 
who was in Mexico shortly after the country had become indepen­
dent. On the west coast, in Tepic, he asked one of the inhab­
itants to tell him his opinion of free trade; the Mexican ans­
wered: "My opinion of the free trade rests on this - formerly
I paid nine dollars for this piece of cloth of which this shirt 
is made; I now pay two." (16) And a British officer, travelling 
over portions of the free republics to the south of the United 
States in 1822, asked many of the people with whom he came in 
contact what they considered the chief benefit derived from 
the revolution of independence. The answer was invariably the 
same: "I can now procure English goods at one third of the price 
at which they could be purchased during the dominion of the 
Spaniards." (17)
If these differences in prices could be generalized - prob­
ably they cannot -, the decrease in prices of textile items in 
a very few years would have been tremendous. Albert Imlah has 
calculated that, on average, export prices of British yarns and 
cotton piece goods fell 72% over the period 1816/18 to 1849/51; 
in the woolen industry the decrease was 63%, and in other British 
exports of manufactured goods, the industries of which were 
much less mechanized at that time, prices fell 45%. Probably, 
this fall in prices was not a significant factor in the very 
early years of Latin American independence when British prices 
were still high for a mass market; it became more important for 
the further development of British trade with Latin America. (18)
Nevertheless, there is much evidence that already in the 
1820s new habits of consumption as a consequence of the sudden 
inflow of foreign manufactured goods had spread over Mexico.
In 1826, G.F. Lyon toured through the country; he observed that 
"the rich picturesque costumes of both sexes are now growing 
into disrepute, and European fashions generally prevail in the 
principal cities." (19) Obviously, it was not only at the top 
level of society, where the European items were appreciated;
Lyon continues: "The poor Indian now finds within his reach 
and his power of purchase, the luxuries and comforts which his 
poverty once denied him; and the abundance and cheapness of 
English linens, clothing, and ornaments, now leads the natives 
to perceive that there are other powerful nations, in addition 
to that of their persecuting conquerors." (20) Lyon's assertion, 
that the Mexican "picturesque costumes" were "growing into 
disrepute", finds a corroboration in an anonymous text, published 
in Mexico in 1832, and entitled Los extranjeros ^ l°s aventu­
reros . The author of the pamphlet encouraged his fellow-country­
men to change their traditional dress and to follow the foreign 
example; he justified his recommendation by a social statement, 
saying that the traditional Mexican wearing apparel "by the 
differences in the clothes expressed the unequality of conditions", 
and this ought to be rejected under a Republican government. (21)
Some years earlier, the British Charge d'Affaires H.G. Ward
- like many others - had pointed out the striking changes in the 
streets of the cities and the mining districts; the opening of 
the "American" (i.e. the Mexican) ports would lead to a much 
higher consumption of European goods by people who hitherto had 
been excluded from the "blessings of civilization": "No better 
proof of this can be given, than the change which I have myself 
witnessed, in the course of three years, in the habits and 
appearance of the lower classes in Mexico. Before the Revolution, 
the streets of the capital were infested with a race of naked 
lazzaroni, whose numbers were supposed to amount to nearly twenty 
thousand, and who were, at once, the disgrace, and the bane, of 
all public places. This class has now almost totally disappeared; 
clothing has become so common, that none appear without it. In
the mining districts, a similar change has occured; and as the 
resources of the country develop themselves, there is little 
doubt that it will gradually spread into the most remote provin­
ces. " (22)
The Europeans living in Mexico were themselves good customers 
of their own goods; furthermore, by their example they stimu­
lated the demand for European goods, especially among middle 
class Mexicans. William Bullock, who in 1825 travelled for six 
months through Mexico, observed that the wardrobe of an English 
lady, who had just arrived in Veracruz, "made a hasty tour through 
most of the respectable houses" of the city and was immediately 
imitated. (23) And only a few years later, William Maclure 
noticed that within a short period of time the overall impression 
had changed substantially: "Two years ago (...) all the women 
were dressed in dismal black, of the same cut and shape as if 
cast all in the same mould. Now London or Paris do not exhibit 
more variety of color and shape, in the dress of both sexes (...) 
Things change with every batch of milliners, merchants and 
tailors, etc. that arrive from the four corners of the civilized 
world." (24) Although Maclure stressed the changes, he also pointed 
out that the large majority of the population had not changed 
their habits: "The Indians, constituting four fifths of the popu­
lation, have always manufactured their own clothes, and do so 
still: the greatest part of the luxuries of the rich, has always 
been imported from Europe, and are so yet." (25)
The social consequence of this differing attitude between 
Indians on the one hand and rich Creoles on the other was a con­
tinuous drifting apart between city and land. While in the cities, 
due to the European import goods and the presence of Europeans, 
a noticeable change took place in dress fashions, habits of con­
sumption, furnishing, style of life of the upper and middle classes, 
among the indios in the countryside old traditions were much more 
preserved. Nearly all the travellers mention the striking and 
conspicuous difference between these two environments. Basically, 
other eye-witnesses confirm this impression. Fanny Calderon de 
la Barca, the Scottish wife of the first Spanish Plenipotentiary 
in Mexico, observed the country for some years very thoroughly.
Speaking about the dress of the Poblana peasants she pointed 
out that it was "a manufacture of the country"; on the other 
hand, in the city she noticed from one year to another a "great 
improvement in toilet" (26).
To maintain the European style of life among the rich Creoles, 
the foreigners had created an extended "infrastructure" of shops 
and services: "Though everything must still be comparatively 
dear, the bad times have caused a great reduction in prices; 
and dear as all goods are, they would still be dearer, were it 
not for the quantity that is smuggled into the republic. There 
are an amazing number of French shopkeepers; French tailors, 
hatters, shoemakers, apothecaries, etc.; but especially French 
modistes and perruquiers. The charges of the former are exor­
bitant, the latter are little employed except by gentlemen.
There are also many Spanish shops, some German, and a few 
English; but I think the French preponderate." (27)
Some travellers and more historians have asserted that the 
urban and rural working class or, more generally speaking, all 
the lower levels of the social structure did not actively partic­
ipate in the economic life of the Republic. If that was so, the 
question is how large were the upper and middle class, potentially 
customers of foreign merchandise. Usually it is said, that in 
the first half of the 19th century, the percentage of this social 
strata was minimal. Nearly all the travellers were attracted by 1 
the highly visible part of the population, the lower groupings, 
including factory and mine workers, semi-rural workers, street 
vendors, intermittently employed day-laborers (jornaleros), 
beggars and leperos. Nevertheless, and according to census 
figures of the 1840s, it should be pointed out that (at least in 
some regions) these percentages were not as low as normally sup­
posed. In the state of Queretaro, f.ex., the groups which were 
(in 1844) of an upper and middle class position in the "urban" 
(non-agricultural) sector came to about 21% of the total. In 
this group are included (at a first level) rentiers, lawyers, 
doctors, professionals, ecclesiastics, merchants with an estimated 
yearly per capita income of 900-1340 $, (at a second level) 
government employees and clerks, owners of large and small scale
industries with an average income of 365-435 $, (at a third 
level) commercial employees and artisans (operators of talleres) 
with an income of 150-200 pesos (28). The average Mexican per 
capita income in 1845 was (estimated) 56$, in Great Britain 
it was 323$, in the United States 274$. (29) The third of the 
above mentioned groups may have been economically rather in­
distinguishable from the impoverished masses and not able to 
participate very actively in a "market economy", but it should 
be said that this social stratification pyramid was elaborated 
by a statistician of the time, and that means, that it reflects 
the way the different strata of the Mexican society saw themselves
- and this autoperception probably influenced their consumption 
behaviour.
Figures for other places at about the same time tend to con­
firm the presence of a sizeable middle sector. For the Villa 
de Guadalupe (near Mexico City, today integrated into the Capi­
tal) the size of the upper and middle strata, for 1856, has 
been estimated at 31% of the total ; and similar data for the 
port of Mazatlan, in Sinaloa, in 1854, show also a 31% of upper 
and middle groups. (30) That means that evidently above the 
laboring level was a not inconsiderable middle class, something 
more than a privileged minority. This group of artisans, small 
shopkeepers, lower-ranking clerks and (in the rural context) the 
rancheros or the small renters of hacienda lands (labradores) 
was characterized by insecurity, not by permanent misery - and 
this distinguished them from the impoverished masses. At least 
potentially, this rather sizeable group were customers of European 
import goods.
Although the different eye-witnesses do not agree in all 
respects, two main conclusions can be drawn from their observa­
tions. The first is that Creoles in the cities changed their 
dress fashions and, together with the Europeans, were the main 
customers of foreign textiles. The second is much less clear; 
if refers to the question to what extent the new clothes were 
also bought and worn by mestizos and indios. The impressions 
differ from one observer to the other; it only seems to be clear 
that European textiles by far did not have the same impact upon
these lower classes of Mexican society, although some alter­
ation in dress seems to have taken place. The overall impression 
is that the change in dress was obvious enough all over Mexico, 
that nearly all the travellers devoted some space to describing 
the differences.
IV.
For the persons directly affected by European imports, these 
foreign commodities appeared as a kind of natural disaster. Many 
contemporary sources and not fewer historical descriptions deal 
with the immediate consequences of the influx of foreign textiles 
on the Mexican artisans. Nevertheless, it is not possible to get 
exact figures of the unemployment caused by the foreign imports, 
or of other consequences, such as the lowering in status of the 
artisans, who looked for a new job or moved into another state. 
Most of the sources refer to "thousands" of artisans, who alle­
gedly became unemployed and therefore poor. This very general 
character of the accusations against the foreign imports has been 
preserved until today. In an edition of sources, f.ex., re-edited 
in 1977, about the "agony of the artisans", Luis Chavez Orozco 
said: "Lo irritante es que el artesanado mexicano haya perecido 
a manos de los intereses comerciales extranjeros, en connivencia 
con los intereses de un sector - mexicano (liberal o conservador), 
solo porque no veía más allá de las tesis librecambistas, a la 
sombra de las cuales podía vivir confortablemente y hasta con 
lujo y elegancia." The artisans were not victims of the Indus­
trial Revolution, but rather of foreign manufactured goods intro­
duced after 1821 in Mexico. (31) And in another of his publica­
tions, Chavez Orozco points out that already during Iturbide's 
Monarchy (1822/23) the Mexican craftsmen experienced the negative 
consequences of the liberal custom's tariff of 1821. The foreign 
imports took their traditional customers away from them, thereby 
destroying jobs and making, within a very few years, "thousands 
of artisans" jobless. (32) Up to a certain point, this interpreta­
tion repeats almost literally the artisans' complaints of the 
1820s. From then on, up till now, nearly all Mexican interpreta­
tions stress the disastrious impact of foreign goods on the
lives of the Mexican artisans insisting that this result was 
due exclusively to the foreign imports.
There seems to be only one noticeable exception: The Sociedad 
Patriótica para el Fomento de las Artes, founded in Puebla in 
July 1830, did not join the unanimous chorus of complainers 
against foreign merchandise ; rather, it rejected any monocausal 
explanation and tried to account for the decline of the Puebla 
artisans enumerating several interdependent reasons. It could 
be, the Sociedad argued, that the Puebla textiles had already 
fallen in the esteem of the customers before the War of Inde­
pendence, due to carelessness in the production of the textiles; 
or the decline was due to a fewer number of consumers because of 
the War of Liberation and epidemics; possibly, Puebla manufac­
turers spread out all over the country during the War, and now 
other provinces that had never done it before, were also produ­
cing textiles; or the problem had to be related to the flight of 
Spanish capital; finally, it could be that the Puebla products 
were not able to compete with imported foreign manufactured goods. 
"All these reasons may have exerted more or less influence upon 
the ruin of our factories." (33) Undoubtedly, this statement 
trying to give a multicausal explanation for the depression in 
the Puebla textile manufacturing industry, was an exception. The 
average "explanation" stressed the negative importance of foreign 
imports.
In March of 1824, the Governor of Puebla, Manuel Gómez Pedraza, 
in his Report to the State Congress referred to the artisans1 
crisis: "El Estado de Puebla, en el nuevo orden de cosas, parece 
estar reducido a ser agricultor: su industria fabril, que, aunque 
imperfecta, hace algunos anos ocupaba sumas considerables, en el 
dia casi ha desaparecido por la concurrencia del extranjero." (34) 
And in the capital of Oaxaca, where at the beginning of the War 
of Independence 500 looms had produced cotton goods, in 1827 not 
more than 50 were working. In the State of Mexico, in 1828 all 
cities noticed the consequences of the textile imports. The 
State's Governor complained that Texcoco had become "a city
deserted and ruined by the emigration of families who went to 
seek a living in more fortunate places." (35) Jalisco and other 
states continuously complained because their craftsmen were 
confronted with unemployment and poverty. The artisans of Jalisco 
even warned the authorities that unless something were done, they 
might attribute their misery to the system of government.
The figures of Oaxaca are confirmed by Mühlenpfordt, an Hanove­
rian engineer, who lived in Mexico from 1827 to 1835 working for 
the Mexican Mining Company and employed by the government of 
Oaxaca as Director of road constructions. We owe him one of the 
best accounts of Mexico in the first half of the 19th century.
For Jalisco, this German author indicates, that the value of 
the manufactured goods produced in 1802 was 3.5 million pesos; 
but after the port of San Bias was opened to foreign trade and, 
especially, after the North Americans introduced all kinds of 
cotton goods into Mexico's northern provinces, the wool and cotton 
manufactures of Jalisco had been nearly extinguished. Only the 
fabrication of rebozos and tapalos continued to have certain 
importance. (36) Mühlenpfordt summed up: "Mexico's factories and 
manufactures, except in a few branches, have become nill." (37)
According to Poinsett, the total value of the textile output 
in 1822 had sunk already to 4 million pesos, while before indepen­
dence it had amounted to 7-8 million pesos. Humboldt had indi­
cated the same value for all manufactures, of which textiles con­
stituted the largest single component, for the beginning of the 
century. For 1810, Tadeo Ortiz de Ayala indicated 9-11 million 
pesos, and José María Quirôs, the Secretary of the Veracruz 
Consulado, in ;his Memoria of 1817 was of the opinion that the 
value of cotton and woolen textiles alone was in excess of 10 
million pesos. (38) Potash suggests that "it is not unlikely (...) 
that New Spain's cloth industry was much more important in terms 
of the value of its output than has generally been recognized." (39)
According to Ortiz de Ayala and Quirós, the import of one 
million pesos in textiles resulted in unemployment for 40,000 
families; in 1810, presumably 9.2 million pesos worth of textiles 
were imported, amounting to 65% of the total imports. Since the 
legal imports in the first years of Mexican independence were
much less important than the imports during the first war-years, 
it can be concluded that the continuous complaints of the artisans 
after 1821 reflected primarily the situation created in the ten 
years before independence and not the result of the opening of 
Mexican ports in 1821.
In any case, the artisans seem to have lived in a state of 
serious crisis in the 1820s. In Puebla f.ex., the most notable 
change over the first twenty years of the century (i.e. including 
the War of Independence) was the dramatic decline in numbers of 
merchants involved in dealing in domestically produced cloth 
(ropa de tierra). The number of retail shops trading with ropa 
de tierra decreased from (1803:) 28 to (1807:) 18 and (1820:) 5, 
while at the same time the merchant-houses selling imported 
European goods increased from (1807:) 10 to (1820:) 13. Continuing 
prosperity can be found in the import trade also after indepen­
dence, and hardship was faced by dealers in Mexican manufactures. 
(40) The coincidence of the artisanal crisis and of national 
independence led to the conviction, widespread among artisans, 
that the government's (tariff and economic) policy was to blame 
for their bad situation. Idealizing the late colonial period, 
that for many of them - as for some historians (41) - soon 
appeared as the "good old days", the artisans unisono asked for 
the re-establishment of the custom barriers; they were naively 
convinced that a return to the former prohibitive measures would 
lead to a renaissance of their relative antebellum-prosperity.
It is impossible to quantify the unemployment rate among the 
artisans; what can be done, is to qualify it, using the popular 
literature, the poetry, verses, handbills, fictional dialogues, 
and pamphlets - a kind of literature that has been very much neg­
lected as an historical source until today. It allows an approach 
to the way of thinking and feeling of the lower strata of the 
Mexican population, especially of the artisans. Many of the ano­
nymous verses seem to have been written by craftsmen, because 
they deal primarily with the problems of this group. The "stories" 
told by the narrator were taken from a collective pool of knowledge 
and experience resulting from the social environment of the
audience. General "national" problems were reduced to the 
personal, singular level, interesting details were imaginative­
ly visualized, the individual fate was represented as expression 
and part of a collective fate.
Very early, according to this literature, the Mexicans were 
convinced that the British were to blame for the ruin of the 
Mexican manufactures and the artisans. In 1825, El Payo del 
Rosario, one of the most famous liberal pamphletists, wrote 
that the English trade had been built "upon the ruins of our 
national business"; that the British had thrown the Mexican 
craftsmen into poverty, importing their manufactured goods; that 
they had "monopolised" the nation with usurious loans; that they 
had promised a "trade amity" worthless for the Mexicans. The 
author warned the Mexicans of the danger of the "British friend­
ship" . The motto of his pamphlet was:
Murió el dominio opresor 
publicando el plan de Iguala; 
mas siendo el inglês traidor 
fue salir de Goatemala 
para entrar en Goatepeor. (42)
Many arguments referring to the social situation of the artisans 
were expressed in the form of fictional dialogues. In most cases, 
it was the artisan's women who expressed the complaints, sorrows, 
and anxieties of this particular estate: (43)
Clara Juana:
Me entristezco, hermana, al ver Cree Vd. está bien dictada
a mil familias sujetas esa ley tan indiscreta,
a la hambre, la desnudez, de que se admitan tejidos
a la más grande pobreza; como los de manta inglesa,
y cuál es la causa, nina, cuando se podía tejer
de tan dolorosa escena? muy superior en la tierra?
In the 1820s, the number of pamphlets and broadsides which 
inundated the country, expanded to a large degree; and nearly all 
the texts complained about the same: First, that the foreigners 
were responsible for the decline of Mexican artisanship; and 
second, that import prohibitions had to be issued in order to
protect the Mexican craftsmen. Finally, at the end of the 1820s, 
the continuous repetition of the same demands was succesful:
The government regulated foreign trade in a way artisans had 
demanded.
V.
As has been pointed out, the custom tariff of 1821 abolished 
all monopolistic trade restrictions of the Spanish, opening the 
Mexican ports to the ships and the goods of all nations. At the 
end of the 19th century, Carlos Diaz Dufôo stated: "The first 
customs tariff was that of an people which, gnawed by the torture 
of scantiness, by a delirious impulse, rushed to the full enjoy­
ment of its exigencies." (44) The list of the prohibited goods 
was relatively small, the custom tariff for most of the imported 
goods amounted to 25% ad valorem. Already the first reform of 
the trade regulation, i.e. the new custom tariff of 1824, took 
into consideration the complaints of the Mexican artisans in-^  
eluding in the list of prohibited goods many finished and semi­
finished goods (especially textiles). In his justification of 
the tariff, Finance Minister Arrillaga indicated explicitly, 
that the prohibitions were made in order to protect the jobs of 
Mexican artisans and industrialists and the interests of agri­
culture. (45) Coarse cotton textiles were excluded from the prohi­
bitions due to the fact that the Mexican production of cotton 
textiles did not fulfill the country's demand. The following 
tariff of 1827 strengthened the protection of the Mexican ar­
tisans, expanding the list of goods that had to pay import duties 
as well as the list of prohibited goods. Nevertheless, the main 
problem of Mexican craftsmen remained: in spite of the custom 
tariff of 40% ad valorem, the Mexican goods could not compete 
with the European ones either in price or in quality. The only 
positive solution of the artisans would have been a complete 
prohibition of all textiles - a measure that the government of 
Guadalupe Victoria was not able to take because of its predominant 
laissez-faire-ideology, its need for revenues from the tariff 
for its national budget and its financial and diplomatic depen­
dence on Great Britain.
It lasted two years more until, in 1829, the popularly sup­
ported Guerrero government enacted import prohibitions against 
the types of textiles which were locally produced. Guerrero had 
come into power semi-illegally, but very much supported by the 
artisans and the lower classes of the Mexican population. The 
overwhelmingly positive reaction of the Mexican artisans to the 
prohibitory decree proves clearly that they interpreted the new 
tariff as a triumph for their interests. The atmosphere of 
Guerrero's short period in office was one of intense economic 
nationalism, commitment to the encouragement of internal trade 
and domestic manufacturing, with strong xenophobic overtones. 
Guerrero's Yorkino-administration marks a turning-point in 
Mexico's economic history. The former governments - influenced 
by Alexander von Humboldt and physiocratic ideas - had imagined 
the real source of Mexican wealth to be the mines and the agri­
culture; Guerrero now proposed a new governmental policy to 
promote industrial development. Two points are of interest:
First, that the import trade should be reduced substantially; 
in practice this meant a drastic extension of import prohibitions. 
From now on, the main purpose of foreign trade policy should no 
longer be fiscal interests of the State, but rather the protec­
tion of native industry. Although the prohibitory measures were 
a clear victory for and by a minority of artisans (especially 
those from Puebla) at the cost of the majority of the population 
and the state revenues, they were not interpreted as favoring 
the interests of a small and privileged group of manufacturers, 
but quite to the contrary as being an opportunistic policy for 
the masses of the population. President Guerrero undoubtedly 
was a popular caudillo of the War of Independence, deeply rooted 
in the lower strata of Mexican society. The movement that had 
brought him to power, had many nativist elements. The trade pro­
hibitions have to be interpreted in connection with other legis­
lative measures, that tended to exclude all foreigners from 
retail trade as well as to expelí the Spaniards, who still re­
mained in Mexico. It can be viewed as a xenophobic tendency in 
Guerrero's policy that laid the blame of Mexico's economic problems
at the foreigners' door and accomodated the widespread xenophobia 
among the population. Decades later, the liberal Miguel Lerdo 
de Tejada complained: "Esta ley, puede muy bien decirse que es 
una de las más severas de cuantas se han dictado en materia de 
prohibiciones, fue, sin embargo, expedida por un gobierno que 
ostentaba los principios mas exagerados de libertad y de progre­
so social, lo cual deja presumir que sus autores, sacrificando 
en ella las ideas que proclamaban, no tuvieron otro objeto que 
el de adquirir popularidad, halagando las opiniones de los que 
creen que así es como deben protegerse las artes y la industria 
nacional." (46)
Second, that the domestic industry should not be supported in­
directly only, via import prohibitions, but also directly by the 
state's acceptance of its responsibility as promoter of indus­
trial development. Guerrero's administration was too short tö 
start an active policy of industrialization; nevertheless, from 
then on the idea that besides the entrepreneurs also the State 
had a certain responsibility in the economic sphere, remained a 
maxim of the Mexican governments.
In spite of the importance attributed to the "Guerrero tariff", 
the import prohibitions never became effective. As they meant 
loosing revenues needed to resist a Spanish invasion in the summer 
of 1829 and, at the end of the year, a rebellion led by Vice- 
president Anastasio Bustamente against Guerrero, a temporary post­
ponement of the measure was necessary. This postponement, however, 
does not mean that the delegates to the National Congress did not 
take seriously their effort to protect the artisans. In the same 
year of 1829, they did not agree to the accomplishing of a project 
intended by Juan Ignacio Godoy, who asked for permission to import 
cotton yarn and some thousand modern hand looms. Godoy held out 
a prospect of increased tax incomes for the State and, especially, 
new jobs for the unemployed artisans. In spite of the advantages 
of the project, the deputies of Puebla opposed it very strongly. 
The artisan-maestros were very conscious of the difference between 
their status and that of a worker in a factory, which was equated 
with an oficial. (47) During the discussion, 1829 in the Puebla 
Congress, of the Godoy project, a deputy expressed the fear that
the conversion from maestros into salaried workers at lower jobs 
would bring disaster to the country. Another visualized the des­
pondency of the artisans, "seeing that by becoming oficiales and 
dependents of the privileged, their industry would be reduced, 
limits would be set to their ingenuity and they would be condemned 
to indigence." (48) To the threat of unemployment for some, then, 
should be added the specter of downward social mobility, of prole- 
tarization for others.
Finally, the Puebla deputies convinced the majority of the 
Parliament of the noxiousness of the project, which was rejected. 
One of the major reasons why the delegates of the National Congress 
turned down the project was the fact that Godoy wanted to develop 
it together with two Englishmen. The delegates got the impression 
that the project was a foreign conspiracy aimed at destroying 
the artisan industry. Godoy justified the involvement of two 
foreigners stating that he needed money for his project and that 
he was not able to get it from his Mexican compatriots. (49) 
Evidently, the lack of capital, or more precisely, the lack of 
disposition to invest capital in the manufacturing sector, was 
one of the characteristics of the first phase of Mexican industria­
lization in the 1830s. Still in 1837, Estevan de Antunano in a 
letter to Lucas Alamán complained that there were enough capitalist 
agiotistas in the country, who nevertheless did not invest their 
capital in the "national development". (50)
When Lucas Alamán came into power, in 1830, he was perfectly 
aware of the problem of financing a new industry. He knew that 
in a "latecomer"-country like Mexico, the introduction of the 
factors of industrial development as inputs into an agrarian and 
pre-industrial society could not be accomplished on a significant 
scale without government investments and programs. This is what 
made the whole process of modernization a very political matter, 
strongly opposed by the liberals as well as by the artisans. The 
former opposed the project because it threw out the idea of 
laissez-faire and of separation of state and industry; the latter 
opposed it because they were convinced that they had as much, 
if not more, to fear from a newly created thriving local industry 
than from foreign imports. It was always possible to mobilize
nationalist feelings against imports, but not so against the 
industrialists, who themselves monopolized from then on Mexican 
"nationalism" as their very own weapon.
Despite this opposition, Bustamante's government - whose 
spiritus rector was Lucas Alaman - founded a "Development Bank" 
called Banco de Avio. The government maintained imports - i.e. 
it again allowed the import of coarse textiles, prohibited by 
the Guerrero administration -, with a protective tariff, and 
ear-marked a part of the revenue (20%) to form the capital of 
the Banco de Avio to finance new large-scale industries. Artisans 
were promised that some funds would also be available for them, 
and that complete prohibition would be established after the 
amount desired for this bank (one million pesos) had been reached.
The main goal pursued by the foundation of the Banco de Avio 
is closely related to the issues so far discussed: foreign trade 
and its repercussion upon Mexican society, customs duties and 
state revenues, unemployment and dependency. In the Memoria of 
1830, Alamán proclaimed as his maxim: "A people has to aim at 
not being dependent on others in things that are indispensable 
for its survival." (51) The means to achieve this goal was seen 
by him in the foundation of factories for goods of mass consump­
tion; luxury goods should not be produced. The Banco de Avio as 
a national government agency in its capacity as an instrument 
of guided change took action and made investments (that is, it 
created an opportunity structure) in order to direct the activi­
ties of entrepreneurs and "capitalists" toward developmental 
goals.
The history of the Banco de Avio has already been written. (52) 
The main question of the following paragraphs is the relation­
ship between the industrialization process and the foreigners or, 
in other words, the foreign contribution to the first phase of 
Mexican industrialization.
VI.
Foreigners, mainly Europeans, played a significant part in 
the industrialization of Mexico in three ways: First, European 
skilled workers installed new machinery and then instructed
Mexican workers on how to use it. (53) Secondly, Europeans 
contributed considerable money necessary to start industrial 
enterprises in Mexico; a large part of the capital invested in 
the incipient industry had been accumulated by trade, and many 
foreign merchants also became industrial entrepreneurs and 
managers. Thirdly, Europeans were highly involved in the dis­
cussion about customs duties in the 1830s and 1840s and, contra­
ry to what might be supposed, not always defending free trade 
regulations.
Mexico in the 1830s gave few if any indications of its in­
dustrial potentialities. The population was overwhelmingly rural 
and agrarian. Non-agricultural production was carried on for 
the most part in the home or in small shops employing the old 
handicraft techniques. One of the main targets of the Banco de 
Avio therefore was, according to its statutes, "the purchase 
and distribution of machines for promoting the different branches 
of industry". European and North American spinning machinery and 
woolloi machines of French invention were imported and helped the 
Mexican cotton and woollaiindustries to get a start. Until the 
end of 1834, the Banco had sent to the Mexican consul in New 
Orleans 160.000 pesos in order to pay for the machinery ordered 
in the U.S. Already in 1831, France had delivered a whole wool- 
factory to be installed in Querêtaro, some time later the machinery 
necessary for silk production; in 1848 the so-called "Jacquard 
loom" was introduced.
The purchasing and installment of the new mills was confronted 
with many difficulties described by Potash, Thomson and others.
In some cases, the machinery was destroyed and couldn't be used, 
in others - as in Antuííano's case - it never reached the Mexican 
shores; or, when the machinery was finally installed, problems 
arose with the technicians. Fanny Calderon de la Barca, visiting 
Antunano's factory in 1841, wrote: "The ignorant foreign workmen 
declared that no good results would ever be obtained; that the 
machines were bad, and the cotton worse." (54) The Englishmen 
failed to make Antunano's machinery work or to instruct native 
workmen in the use of machinery. But in spite of all the diffi­
culties, in the 1830s the Banco de Avio and the 1840s private
industrialists continued to import new machinery from abroad.
In 1843, one year after the dissolution of the Bank, 59 spinning 
and weaving mills with a total of 125,362 spindles were in opera­
tion or in process of being installed. (55)
The French, British and American specialists (artisans, me­
chanics, technicians) employed to operate the new machines were 
payed enormous salaries, ranging from about 700 up to 4000 pesos 
a year. Some of them couldn't start working, since upon their 
arrival in Mexico the machines still were stored in the port of 
Veracruz (Santa Anna's "revolution" of 1832 impeded the transpor­
tation of the machines to Querêtaro or Celaya where they were 
supposed to be installed). Until 1835, the Banco had spent more 
than 100,000 pesos for salaries for foreign technicians who 
basically had not yet begun working. (56) Others had to be lodged 
in a secret place near Puebla because the local weavers who were 
extremely hostile to machinery, menaced their safety as well 
as Antufiano's life. The same hostility wrecked a ginning enter­
prise in the cotton area of Veracruz. (57)
Nevertheless, a great number of foreigners seemed to have been 
"imported" from Europe to show the Mexicans how to use the new 
machinery. Quoting again Calderon de la Barca, in 1841: "We now 
hear a great deal of their (Puebla's) cotton-factories, and of 
the machines, instruments, and workmen, brought from Europe here, 
already giving employment to thirty thousand individuals." (58)
The Mexican industrialists generally esteemed the work done 
by the foreigners. In 1843 they stated that the Mexican artisans 
had made such progress due to "the instruction thatthey have got 
from the many foreign masters who have come hither". (59) The 
French and British artisans founded in Mexico a savings-bank, 
that was repeatedly mentioned in the Memorias óf the General 
Direction of Agriculture and Industry; the Memorias recommended 
to the Mexican artisans to imitate the saving-behaviour of the 
foreigners. (60)
The hiring of foreign mechanics and technicians pursued two 
goals: First, the specialists were necessary to start working 
the machinery. Second, they were supposed to instruct the Mexi­
cans how to operate the plants. Many of the contracts specified
the foreigner's obligation to train the natives; the "importation" 
of foreigners was intended to have a "demonstration effect".
In this first phase of Mexican industrialization, the foreign 
"development aid" had much more the character of an "intelli­
gence import" than that of a "capital import".
Nevertheless, capital was of crucial importance in this first 
phase of Mexican industrialization. In the twelve years of its 
existence, the Banco de Avio granted net loans of approximately 
770,000 pesos, and it spent about 250,000 pesos for new machinery. 
The Bank's investment amounted consequently to a sum of more 
than one million pesos. From this amount, cotton factories got 
65.8% of the total loans (509,000 pesos), the textile industry 
as a whole received 71.1% of the net loans and 73% of the amount 
spent for new machinery. (61) In spite of these impressive 
figures, the number of textile factories which were aided finan­
cially by the Bank, was very small, about a dozen. On the other 
hand, in 1843, as already mentioned, there existed not less 
than 59 textile factories, and one year later 62. They worked 
with more than 112,000 spindles and 1,900 mechanical looms. In 
these years, the value of the Mexican manufacturing establish­
ments was estimated by Brantz Mayer at 10 million pesos, by 
Waddy Thompson at 8 million pesos, by German consular sources 
at 12 to 15 million pesos. (62) These figures indicate clearly 
that, apart from the initial boost from the funds of the Banco 
de Avio, the largest part of the investments came from private 
sources. The question is, whether these sources were Mexican 
or foreign ones.
VII.
Historians repeatedly have argued that Alamán's industriali­
zation policy was directed against foreigners. Carlos Diaz Dufôo 
f.ex. has interpreted the whole project as having been inspired 
"by bad intentions against foreign capital", and other historians 
have declared the opposition against foreign investments as a 
characteristic of the program of the Banco de Avio. (63) Obvious­
ly, these arguments confound cause with effect. While no Mexican 
source indicates any kind of aversion against foreign invest-
ments in the beginning of industry, there are enough proofs of 
the foreign aversion against the industrialization project. The 
British Charge d 1Affaires H.G. Ward f.ex. stated as early as 
1827: "Mexico cannot, during the present century, be a manufac­
turing country, and, probably, will not attempt it." (64) This 
opinion basically reflected the point of view of many Mexicans. 
With exactly the same words, the newspaper El Observador wrote 
in 1830: "Los mexicanos no somos ni podemos ser en mucho tiempo 
manufactureros." (65) Also in 1830, the British Consul General 
Charles 0'Gorman called the foundation of the Banco de Avio a 
"concession to popular prejudices" (66), and ten years later 
Madame Calderon de la Barca wrote skeptically: "The bank (avio 
meaning pecuniary assistance, or advance of funds) was established 
by Don Lucas Alamán, and intended as an encouragement to industry. 
But industry is not of the nature of the hothouse plant, to be 
forced by artificial means; and these grants of funds have but 
created monopolies, and consequently added to the general pov­
erty." (67) Also the German consuls and diplomats spoke quite 
contemptuously about the "piteous experiments of the native in­
dustry." (68)
The foreign attitude towards Mexican industrialization was 
not reduced to mocking rejection only. At least some foreigners 
also supported actively attempts of stopping the industrializa­
tion process. When in the beginning of 1832, Santa Anna started 
his "revolution" against the Bustamante/Alamán government asking 
for Alamán's dismissal, the foreign merchants of Veracruz 
supported him. Especially well known is the case of the British 
vice-consul Joseph Welsh who openly advocated Santa Anna's cause. 
(69) The main reason for Welsh's bias against Alamán is to be 
found in his opposition to the minister's industrialization 
program which was interpreted by him as being opposed to British 
exports. On the other hand, the British merchants of Mexico 
(City) pointed out that Welsh's "doing so is without our appro­
bation, and that his acts must be considered as those of an 
individual, and not as of a representative of the British res­
idence in this republick." (70)
. An anonymous pamphlet of 1832 intitled 0 auxiliamos al 
gobierno, o la patria va al infierno stated that some British 
and the major part of the French and the other foreigners in 
Mexico had supported Santa Anna, this "destructive Nero", and 
that they intended to take over the Republic as their booty; 
therefore, it was the patriotic duty of all Mexicans to fight 
against this upheaval. The British Charge d 1Affaires Richard 
Pakenham observed (71) in the government "a tendency to irri­
tate the minds of the Mexican people against foreigners". He 
concluded that "it entered into the policy of the Government 
rather to countenance than discourage the propagation of these 
pernicious ideas, with the view to attach to the insurrection of 
General Santa Anna the odium of having been brought about by 
foreign agency." And the representative of the Banco de Avio in 
the U.S. wrote in 1832 that the natural distrust already existing 
in the States against the industrialization was growing, and 
that the forces opposed to that program were trying to convince 
the spinners and weavers already hired, not to leave for Mexico. 
(72)
Obviously, among the foreign merchants in Mexico as well as 
in the countries trading with Mexico there were forces trying 
to ridicule and to undermine the industrialization program. This 
attitude seems to be compatible with the main interest of foreign 
merchants, namely to import manufactured goods to Mexico. There 
were, nevertheless, also other opinions and interests among the 
foreigners. Many of them embraced the country's industrializa­
tion and contributed to a great extent to its development. Even 
the Banco de Avio, allegedly founded in opposition to foreign 
interests, granted loans to foreigners - paradoxically also to 
foreigners who really had been opposed to its program such, as 
the family of the above mentioned British vice-consul Welsh, who 
in the meantime had founded a textile factory in Jalapa.
Lucas Alamán himself founded a textile factory in Orizaba, 
together with the two Frenchmen Augusto and Próspero Legrand 
who supplied the major part of the capital. They also were 
helped by a loan from the Banco de Avio, as was another French­
man, Jose Faure. These few examples indicate that the state-
sponsored Mexican industrialization strategy of these years 
was not xenophobic, as it has been repeatedly asserted. Quite 
to the contrary: Probably, the State representatives encouraged 
foreign investments because they could be an example and an 
incentive for the reluctant Mexicans.
Much more important than the examples of factories sponsored 
by the Bank, are the others, where foreigners founded without 
State help, but very often in cooperation with native Mexicans, 
and protected (from 1837/33 on) by the import prohibitions, new 
industrial enterprises. The largest amount of the invested for­
eign capital came from foreign merchant houses already estab­
lished in Mexico, and flowed into the textile industry. Neither 
phenomena is surprising due to the fact that (besides the 
Church) the (foreign) merchants were the only ones who had 
enough money to invest, and that the textile industry was the 
most protected by tariffs between 1837 and 1846. All the ex­
amples of foreign and native merchant capital invested in in­
dustrial enterprises worked in a similar way. First, the merchants 
"accumulated" their capital through trade enterprises, through 
speculation with public and private debts, through lending money 
to the government as agiotistas, sometimes through investments 
in real estate (although this latter form of investment was more 
characteristic of a second or even third "investment phase"); 
secondly, the merchants diversified their investments, and in 
the 1830s and 1840s invested heavily in productive enterprises. 
Many times, they didn't invest directly; rather, they became 
creditors of the new industrialists, and when these for a variety 
of reasons were not able to repay their debts, the merchant 
bankers became partners in the enterprise or took it over 
completely.
Nearly all the studies about entrepreneurs published in the 
last few years point out this two-phase-mechanism. The volume 
edited by Ciro Cardoso (73) "Formation and Development of the 
Bourgeoisie in Mexico in the 19th Century", f.ex. contains eight 
essays, each dealing with another representative of the "Mexican" 
bourgeoisie. The curious phenomenon is that six out of these
eight entrepreneurs were foreigners, and the other two (Francis­
co Somera and Manuel Escandôn) creoles in the first generation.
Of the six foreigners, four were Spaniards: Beistegùi, Gregorio 
Mier y Terán, Isidoro de la Torre, Valentin Rivero; one Irish: 
Patricio Milmo; and one Panamenian: Martinez del Rio. There 
exist other studies about "Mexican" entrepreneurs, and nearly 
all of them were foreigners who first were merchants and later 
on became industrialists: The dissertation of David Walker ana­
lyses the Martinez del Rio family; and in the collective volume 
about the "Pioneers of German Imperialism in Mexico" are included 
several examples of German merchants who invested in textiles, 
f.ex. Hermann Stahlknecht and Julius Hildebrand, in Durango;
J. Bahnsen, in San Luis Potosí; Archibaldo Hoppe, in Mexico City.
(74) On the other hand, only very few Mexican entrepreneurs have 
deserved the attention of the historians, the most important one 
being Estevan de Antunano of Puebla. It is no coincidence that 
most studies about entrepreneurs are about foreigners in Mexico, 
and it is also no coincidence that several of them are included
in a volume about "Mexican" bourgeoisie, because in their attitude 
and their investment practices they did not differ basically 
from their (few) Mexican counterparts.
Most of the textile-entrepreneurs formed stock companies for 
financing and administering their enterprises, generally two, 
three or four partners, sometimes of the same family, but more 
often unrelated by blood. One of the characteristics was the 
association between Mexicans and foreigners. The example of Lucas 
Alamán, who together with two Frenchmen founded the cotton yarn 
factory Cocolapam near Orizaba, has already been mentioned. Pedro 
Sainz de Baranda associated himself with the American John L. Mac 
Gregor, and together they founded in Yucatan the Aurora Yucateca.
(75) On the Mexican west coast, Manuel Escandôn and Eustace 
Barron, the British consul in San Bias, cooperated closely and 
organized, through their textile factories La Escoba and Jauja
a large part of the contraband of this region. In Puebla, Estevan 
de Antunano founded, together with the Spaniard Gumesindo Savirlon, 
the famous Constancia Mexicana, and the Spaniard José Dionisio 
Velasco formed a company with the Veracruz import traders Andres
Vallarino and Ciriaco Marron and founded the factory El 
Patriotismo Mexicano.
Several reasons made it desirable to form joint companies 
between foreigners and natives: (76)
1) Foreign merchants usually had much better international 
relations, whereby the purchase of new machinery or the introduc­
tion of the latest know-how was facilitated.
2) The foreign partner, in most of the cases, was a (whole­
sale-) merchant, who wanted to invest his surplus; if the enter­
prise needed new credits, the economic and often personal rela­
tionship between the foreign partner and other foreign merchant 
bankers made it easier to get the needed loan.
3) The association with a foreigner could be helpful in case 
of political turmoil and as a protection against too capricious 
financial burdens imposed by the government. Although foreign 
enterprises also were obliged to pay forced loans and other 
more or less forced contributions, generally the Mexican author­
ities handled them more carefully because of their possibility 
of asking their respective legation for help; the "Pastry War" 
between Mexico and France was due to unsatisfied (although highly 
exaggerated) claims by the French against Mexico.
In one form or another, foreigners were vital in industrial 
investment and management. For Puebla, it has been pointed out 
that the Spanish contingent was the most significant. Foreigners 
were essential in building the factories and in operating them: 
the skilled mule spinner, the millwright, the machine specialist. 
Foreign wholesale and retail merchants, spurned by Puebla during 
the 1820s and early 1830s, became increasingly important during 
the 1840s as creditors to the new industry. Perhaps the strongest 
comment, according to Thomson, on the nature of industrialization 
(in Puebla and other parts of Mexico) was the failure of the 
industrialists as a group to generate autonomous capital forma­
tion from their own enterprises, to found a bank and to release 
themselves from an excessive dependence upon credits obtained 
from import houses and cotton monopolists. (77) To a certain 
degree, the industrialization which took place mainly in 
Central Mexico between 1835 and 1845, was a readjustment in the 
investment of merchant capital. The merchant of the late colonial 
putting out system of independent weavers and spinners had
become the merchant manufacturer involved in and possessing 
the process of production itself.
According to a Report of the Association of Mexican Industria­
lists of 1843, 85% of the cotton industrialists were either 
Mexicans or Spaniards; the remaining 15% were English, French, 
North Americans and Germans. These figures have been accepted 
uncritically by the Mexican historians; nevertheless, they must 
be handled very carefully for several reasons. First, it is not 
understandablewhy Mexicans and Spaniards are summed up under one 
heading as if they had the same citizenship. The Spanish and the 
Mexican citizenship were clearly separated since the denouncement 
of the Plan de Iguala and the Tratados de Cordoba, since the ex­
pulsion of the Spaniards and since the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Spain and Mexico. Secondly, these figures 
probably include only foreign owners and do not consider that 
many factories were highly indebted to foreign creditors, who 
practically controlled the factories without being formally the 
proprietor. Thirdly, many foreigners were partners in Mexican 
factories which officially were considered Mexican, but were at 
the most partially Mexican. There is no doubt, that the percent­
age of foreigners in the textile industry of Mexico in the 1830s 
and 1840s was higher than indicated by official figures.
Mexican authorities had good reasons to make foreign partici­
pation appear as low as possible. In the 1830s, industrializa­
tion had been started in order to become independent from foreign 
countries; if foreign participation in industry appeared to be 
too high, it contradicted the initial goal. Furthermore, indus­
trialization was interpreted as a national and patriotic matter 
that was supposed to put Mexico on an equal level with other 
industrialized countries in Europe. The names given to the new 
factories are symptomatic of this underlying idea: Aurora (Sun­
rise) , Fama (Fame), Constancia (Constancy), Patriotismo (Patrio­
tism) , Buena Fe (Good Faith), Hercules (Hercules), Libertad 
(Liberty), Prosperidad (Prosperity), Victoria (Victory). Equally 
characteristic of the prevailing nationalism in the Mexican 
industrialization process is the fact that nearly all "Industrial
Companies" founded in the 1830s following an initiative of the 
Banco de Avio, were of state origin. According to Potash, civil 
servants - probably due to the pressure of the district political 
leaders (jefes politicos) - and priests bought most of the stocks 
of the new industrial societies, which they contemplated more as 
a semi-public institution with patriotic aims than as an economic 
enterprise.
VIII.
The early Mexican industrialization attempts of the 1830s 
repeatedly have been interpreted as a failure. Most of these in­
terpretations do not develop a theoretical framework of the 
industrialization process or economic growth. They simply claim, 
as the Liberals already did in the 19th century, that after the 
closing of the Banco de Avio in 1842, manufacturing capacity did 
not expand very much and that in the middle of the century the 
modern textile industry could not serve to contradict the accu­
sation of its opponents and detractors; that it was a forced 
exotic plant only existing by virtue of prohibitive tariffs and 
at the expense of the consumer. (78)
Basically, the assertion that Mexican industrialization in 
this early phase failed, is correct; nevertheless, it succeeded 
in providing urban employment (79) and an outlet for domestic 
and, even more, for foreign capital investment in an economy 
where other investment opportunities (excepting risky specula­
tions) wer^ still lacking. (80) And the achievement of the new 
merchant-industrialists should not be underestimated. Most enter­
prises survived under sometimes very hard conditions; some of 
the new enterprises showed a remarkable resilience. The industria­
lization of the 1830s, therefore, cannot be characterized as a 
complete failure, albeit it did not represent the beginning of 
a (new) phase of economic growth.
Some elements of existing historical models of growth can be 
applied to Mexico in order to explain the final failure of the 
industrialization efforts. The model developed by Alexander
Gerschenkron may be useful, because its emphasis rests heavily 
upon the beginnings of growth and does not - as the model devel­
oped by Rostow does - look forward in its economics to the mass 
consumption society. (81) The general assumption of the Gerśchen- 
kron-model is that the more backward a country is, the more rapid 
will be its initial industrial development. Some of Gerschenkron's 
"operational rules" which deal with more specific aspects of the 
growth problem can be adapted to the Mexican case:
1) According to Gerschenkron, the more backward the country, 
the more sophisticated will be the industrial equipment which
it selects for its manufacturing debut. This will be so, because 
the backwardness of follower-countries is itself partly defined 
by the advanced nature of the technology at work inside the leader 
economies. By purchasing modern machines, the backward country 
can obtain segments of this technology. Mexico, indeed, ordered 
and got the newest textile machinery at that time, and the result 
was that the productivity of the new textile industry was compar­
able to the textile productivity of the U.S. and European coun­
tries. (82) But within the deprived Mexican economy, the high- 
quality equipment did not produce the desired effect of pulling 
the borrowing country abruptly forward into the industrial race - 
which, according to Gerschenkron, was supposed to happen.
2) Gerschenkron asserts that the backward economy tends to 
use not only modern equipment, but also generous amounts of this 
new technology. Its need to compensate for the shortcomings of 
its labor supply in skills requires every effort to replace men 
with machines. This "operational rule", in the Mexican case worked 
only for approximately a decade. The Banco de Avio was already 
closed in 1842, and also private entrepreneurs did not continue 
purchasing larger amounts of new machinary from the mid 1840s on.
3) The backward economy tends to require a great deal of 
assistance of an institutional kind and substitutes for the limi­
tations of the recruitment of entrepreneurs. In a context of 
"medium backwardness", where shortage of capital is often the 
major bottleneck, this assistance often takes the form of inno­
vation within the banking institutions, producing specialized
industrial investment banks. (That was the case of 19th century 
Germany.) In a context of "chronic backwardness", the state is 
used as the co-ordinating and managerial agency. (In this context, 
Gerschenkron points to the imperial bureaucracy in Russia as an 
example.)
Probably, this last aspect of Gerschenkron1s model fits best 
in the Mexican case. Mexico's backwardness made the presence of 
creative capitalists (one of Rostow's essential demands) improb­
able; some other agency must take their place. Backward Mexico 
"substituted" her lack of an indigenous stream of innovation by 
imports of advanced technology; she substituted the lack of accu­
mulation of native capital by attracting foreigners (foreign 
merchants) and making use of their funds; she substituted the 
lack of a sufficient number of skilled native labor by introducing 
foreign workmen; and she substituted the services of an entrepre­
neurial ginger group by state action. The state-run Banco de Avio 
took over a great deal of the risks, which in a modern, developed 
and competitive society is characteristic of the rôle of the 
entrepreneur. (82a)
Although many of Gerschenkron's "substitutes" were present in 
Mexico's 19 th century, the country did not experience (in Rostow's 
terminology) a "stage of take-off" and did not embark upon the 
"drive to maturity" where the process of industrial growth should 
have become "sustained", or irreversible. Several reasons contri­
bute to the explanation of the stagnation of the industrialization 
efforts already beginning before the middle of the century. These 
reasons can be summed up in three different "sets" of explanations:
A) "Objective" "physical" reasons
The first set are "objective" "physical" reasons. The satura­
tion of the internal markets because of the sudden expansion of 
manufactured goods in the years before, the lack of purchasing 
power of the great majority of the Mexican population, the enor­
mous problems of infrastructure, mainly transportation and communi­
cation, which hindered an expansion of the market. It hafe been
estimated f.ex., that the difference in productivity between 
the Mexican and U.S. economies in the 19th century would have 
been reduced (all other things being equal) by at least one-third, 
if Mexico had shared the transport facilities that the U.S. had. 
(83)
B) Reasons of "political economy"
The second set of explanations has to do with state action, 
with economic policies or political economy. The French scholar 
Raymond Aron, in his "Lectures on Industrial Society" has enumera­
ted some forces which impel entrepreneurs towards an interest 
in economic areas. (84) Aron mentions appetite for progress and 
change, interest in science and technique and - most important 
for the Mexican case - the habit of economic calculation. The 
latter will function within the framework of a relatively rational 
and predictable system of administration. Capricious or unstable 
governments are bad preconditions for long-range plans and commit­
ments by businessmen. Gerschenkron expects that the state will 
take up a position of major organizational importance in the 
economic process of very backward countries; Aron argues that 
the state should provide rational administrative, judicial, and 
fiscal systems as part of the framework for efficient private 
enterprise.
This condition, basically, did not exist in Mexico. Not only 
the political instability, the continuous change of government 
and regimes, the civil wars and foreign interventions created a 
hazardous environment for business in which large fixed capital 
was involved. Moreover, the economic policies of the governments 
were contradictory. Some examples will illustrate the problem:
1) T^e Junta °f the Banco de Avio declared in its Report of 
1835, that the order of the liberal Finance Minister Gómez Farias, 
of 1833, according to which the duties assigned to the Bank were 
suspended, had "dealt the mortal blow to Mexican industry." (85) 
Probably, this statement was exaggerated, but nevertheless: There 
was no continuity in the industrialization policy of the different 
governments. (86)
2) Although Alamán tried to create a modern industry, he did 
not (and did not want to) solve one basic contradiction: He wanted 
to generate modern industrial progress, maintaining at the same 
time one of the largest obstacles to this progress, the land of 
the Church. He was opposed to any kind of disamortization of
the ecclesiastical estates, a measure that would have put into 
circulation the large capital reserves of the Church. Rather, he 
wanted to fortify the remainder of colonial society adding to the 
already existing privileged groups (clergy, hacendados) the new 
group of industrialists. His idea of state interventionism was 
at least in the same degree a colonial legacy as it was rooted 
(as has been asserted) in Edmund Burke's and Adam Smith's economic 
concepts. To express it in the words of one of the historians of 
Mexican liberalism: His goal, "contradictory in itself, was, co­
lony with industry". (87)
3) The problems of supply of raw cotton and import prohibi­
tions: The import prohibitions of 1837 which were in force until 
1846, referred not only to cotton goods and cotton yarn, but 
also to raw cotton, and what was supposed to be a help for the 
new industries, became a major obstacle for their further develop­
ment. (88) During the first years of the prohibitions, the Mexican 
cotton still was sufficient to supply the newly created factories. 
But when their number increased, the cotton supply became one of 
the major problems of the Mexican textile industry. In 1840, the 
discrepancy between supply and demand of raw cotton was so high, 
that the former cartel between cotton growers and factory owners 
was destroyed for good. The industrialists now demanded again the 
free importation of raw cotton and cotton yarn - first, because 
the Mexican cotton was not sufficient, and secondly because its 
price had been rising continuously: from 25$ in 1839 to 40$ one 
year later. (89) In 1843 and 1844, Santa Anna permitted the 
importing of 60,000 and 20,000 quintales of raw cotton, but this 
amount was not sufficient by far, and the manufacturers continued 
complaining that the high price of cotton made it impossible for 
them to manufacture textiles at competitive prices. But the con-
tinuous complaints of the industrialists remained unsuccessfull - 
all the more since in 1843 the import prohibitions had been in­
cluded in the new constitution and could only be abolished by a 
vote of two thirds of the states (now called departamentos). Only 
in 1846, shortly before the outbreak of the war against the U.S. 
and after the federal republic had been restored, the importation 
of cotton was again allowed with permisos de importación de 
algodón, because the government urgently needed funds to finance 
the war.
Undoubtedly, most factories had been founded because import 
prohibitions of foreign textiles protected the national market.
But during the whole decade of these import prohibitions, politi­
cians continuously discussed the possibility of abolishing them
- first, because theyneeded revenues, secondly, because the foreign 
merchants and, on their behalf, the foreign diplomats exerted 
pressure upon the Mexican government to allow the importation of 
foreign textiles again. These discussions created uncertainty 
among the industrialists. Already in 1829, William Drusina had 
complained in a letter to his partner Martinez del Rio about 
Mexican economic policy: "These people work in such a manner that 
the devil himself cannot say what they will be doing here in one 
or two years." (90)
4) The next example is very closely related to the former one: 
Despite the import prohibitions, foreign textiles were continuously 
imported - due to many exceptional permits. For example in 1838/39 
the federalists, who had taken over Tampico, allowed the importa­
tion of forbidden cotton, and even reduced the former customs 
tariff by 25%; or in 1840, General Mariano Arista allowed the 
local merchants of Matamoros to import two million pounds of 
yarn because he urgently needed the duties resulting from customs 
tariffs to sustain his troops. In this case, the foreign merchants 
(at least some) had a profit, while the foreign industrialists 
complained heavily and tried to overturn Arista's action. While 
the French Minister supported the reclamations of his nationals, 
the British did not, since he represented the merchants' and not 
the industrialists'interests. Some authors intimate that the dila­
tory treatment of this case by the Bustamante government contri-
buted to its fall in 1841. (91) In the following years, Santa 
Anna also made several exceptions. The main reason for these 
"policies of exception" was always the same: the local, regional 
or national rulers depended on the money collected at the custom 
houses of Veracruz, Tampico, Matamoros, or any other port. The 
duties on imported cloth had been the principal contribution to 
government revenues, and a government without this source of 
revenue was must vulnerable. But, allowing the importations, they 
contradicted their own laws and inhibited any rational calcula­
tion on the part of the industrialists.
5) In the war between Mexico and the U.S. the North Americans 
abolished the import prohibitions in the ports occupied by them, 
introducing a liberal tariff system and allowing not only the 
importing of raw cotton and cotton yarn, but also of cotton cloth, 
opening the Mexican market again to the cheaper foreign textiles. 
Although after the war the import prohibitions were temporarily 
re-introduced, the war marked a deep caesura in the history of 
Mexican custom policy. Soon after the war, a generation of young 
liberals came to power and eliminated, step by step, the prohibi­
tions .
6) Finally, the eternal phenomenon of contraband also hurt the 
incipient Mexican industry. The contraband trade has to be treated 
as a political variable because such activity is the natural 
result of a government's attempt to influence market forces. Esti­
mates of the amount of the smuggling vary from 10% to more than 
50% - and although, because of obvious reasons, it is hard to 
ascertain the exact amount of smuggled goods, Mexican and foreign 
sources cite overwhelming evidence that throughout the 19th 
century smuggling was one of the major occupations of Mexican
and foreign merchants. Martinez del Rio Hermanos f.ex. identified 
contraband commerce as the chief cause of the bankruptcy of the 
Miraflores factory in 1861. (92)
The conclusion of these examples is very clear: The Mexican 
state did not provide what Raymond Aron has called a rational 
administrative, judicial, and fiscal system as part of the frame­
work for efficient private enterprise. (93) In this sense, the
Mexican state inherited a fatal legacy from the Spanish colonial 
administration which - as has been recently pointed out - imposed 
many constraints on colonial economic activity, making economic 
organization inefficient and thus reducing the productivity of 
the economy. (94)
C) Reasons concerning the attitudes of economic subjects
The third set of explanations (even if it is a dangerous 
field) are also non-economic variables, elements which react to, 
and react upon the objective physical factors (such as raw 
materials, labor supplies, investment capital, or the lack of them), 
namely the behavior of entrepreneurs, the attitudes of economic 
subjects. Social characteristics may exert an influence upon the 
course of industrialization at least as powerful as any derived 
from the more basic economic equipment. The form of social organiza­
tion as well as the climate of opinion within which entrepreneu­
rial behavior occurs will function as an important determinant 
of industrial activity. Talcott Parsons speaks of "role expecta­
tions" inherent in every society and protected by its system of 
rewards and retributions. (95) Together, the role expectations 
and their protective mechanism constitute a "social value system" 
which has a substantial ability to condition the activities of 
society's individual members. Consequently, for the entrepreneu­
rial objectives to be effectively pursued, it is necessary that 
the fundamental behavioral patterns of capitalism (risk-taking, 
profit-motivation etc.) should interlock smoothly with the 
society's prevailing value system, and should receive the "social 
approval" of the community. Did these conditions exist in Mexico? 
Obviously, the answer to this question can only be tentative, more 
an hypothesis than a real answer.
In his study on Mexico's mercantile evolution in the 19th 
century, Pablo Macedo, one of the representatives of the científicos1 
positivist ideology in the late Porfirian era, explained the pre­
eminence of foreigners in Mexico's commercial activities adducing, 
among others, one major reason: The traditional Mexican contempt 
for commercial activities compared to the social prestige enjoyed 
by lawyers, physicians, priests or high ranking soldiers. (96)
Macedo's statement with regard to the merchants can be extended 
to the industrialists. It is doubtful, whether "the impact of 
western man", as William Woodruff has called it (97), led to 
the creation of a Mexican spirit of enterprise among an entrepre­
neurial class.
The opinions of Mexican contemporaries about this question are 
of little help, because they are as contradictory as is the inter­
pretation of the industrialization process itself. In 1843, the 
industrialists spoke of a generalized "industrial spirit" and 
interpreted the new industry as being an "active-body" in the 
Republic. (98) At the same time, the liberal Mariano Otero noted 
the complete "disappearance of the spirit of enterprise, which 
for a moment had shone in the textile industry". (99) Several 
arguments seem to corroborate this opinion:
First, the initial boost from the funds of the Banco de Avío 
was decisive and made the first stages of Mexican industrializa­
tion appear to have been more a state enterprise than a private 
economic one. Secondly, the close connection between Mexicans 
and foreigners can be interpreted as timidity on the part of the 
Mexican entrepreneurs, who did not show entrepreneurial behavior 
à la Schumpeter. (100) Thirdly, the import prohibitions between 
1837 and 1846 were a crucial condition for the decision of Mexicans 
to invest. In Puebla f.ex., Estevan de Antunano was the only 
merchant who invested in textile manufacturing prior to the issue 
of the import prohibitions. Fourthly, the legacy of colonial 
rule also in this sector: Before Independence, the mother country 
had frowned upon the efforts of colonials to develop some types 
of handicraft industries; at times the Spanish government had 
followed a policy of outright suppression and prohibition, at 
other times industry had been fettered by burdensome rules. It 
followed from such a policy that the Mexicans, once free of Spain, 
did not have a satisfactory background in manufacturing, and that 
the climate of opinion which fosters ingenuity and alertness for 
profitable investment was largely absent. (101) In 1843, in an 
article about Mexican industry, the anynomous author wrote : ,łLos 
extranjeros han hecho su fortuna por nuestra apatía." (102)
These arguments seem to confirm largely the absence of com­
bative and creative entrepreneurs in this phase of Mexican industria­
lization. This phenomenon can be interpreted not only as a result 
of the prevailing value system, but rather as a consequence of 
the colonial legacy and the political economy of the Mexican state.
The dawn of the 1850s, when many factories had to shut down, 
was also the end of a passage of political and economic pre-eminence 
of a generation of essentially conservative and protectionist 
entrepreneurs. The American War signalled the end of the short 
age of protectionism, the rise of new liberal leaders and the 
beginning of a new phase in Mexico's economic history.
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